The past 48 hours have taught the BJP a harsh lesson in the vicissitudes of the political news cycle. On Tuesday, the party was on a high, having effectively forced the UPA government on the defensive on the scandal involving coal block allocations. Even those who had been critical of the party’s obstructionist stance in Parliament were compelled to concede that the relentless campaign had paid off, with ever more disquieting details of the scandal tumbling out.
But barely a day later, the verdict in the Naroda Patiya massacre of 2002, in which former BJP Minister Maya Kodnani was found guilty of murder and conspiracy, has recoiled on the party. Of course, this is a lower court verdict, against which appeals will be made in a higher court.
Yet, the fact that the 2002 riots cases, which have been winding their weary way through the judicial process amidst all the political sloganeering, have struck so close to the political establishment and secured the conviction of a former Minister, no less, is deeply damaging for the party.
More specifically, the verdict has already reignited the chatter about the extent to which the Gujarat government, and Chief Minister Narendra Modi in particular, were complicit in the riots. More and more will we hear it be asked: Just how much did Narendra Modi know of the riots in real time?
It is one thing that Kodnani was, as the right-wing blogger @offstumped points out, perceived for long as being in the faction within the BJP that was opposed to Modi.
Contemporaneous media reports in 2005 referred to her as being “anti-Modi” and campaigning for Modi’s ouster. This, in turn, has fed conspiracy theories about the root cause of the riots (beyond the proximate cause of the Godhra train burning) and their plausible connections to power dynamics within the BJP.
Yet, Modi’s failure over the years to speak with candour about the political undercurrents that eddied beneath the riots has tainted him by association and fed the narrative that he and his government were actually complicit in the riots. Beyond noting, as he did even recently in an interview to the Wall Street Journal, that he and his government had nothing to apologise for in respect of the 2002 riots, he has not addressed the political dynamics that were at play then.
Particularly in contrast to the high-decibel barrage of the accusations against him, his silence, which appears stoic, has been self-incriminating. And even if his vocal army of diehard supporters are evidently convinced of his personal innocence, such a strategy has not enabled Modi to dispel the lingering doubts in the minds of those in the middle ground.
The legal runaround over the 2002 Gujarat riots may continue for a while, and to the extent that they help secure a semblance of justice to the victims of the riots, that process should continue. In any case, just the fact that convictions are being secured in the Gujarat riots, in stark contrast to the colossal failure to secure any justice for the victims of previous riots (including one of the the most chilling pogroms against Sikhs in 1984 following the assassination of Indira Gandhi) shows that the wheels of justice spin, even if only slowly and selectively.
But even if the cases don’t lead to Modi’s doorstep, the political taint from association is proving hard for him to wipe off. Within Gujarat, of course, he has converted the political campaign against him into an issue of Gujarati pride, and leveraged it for political goodwill. But beyond Gujarat, that victimhood narrative doesn’t enjoy as much resonance, which could prove a liability for him as he looks to spread his wings at the national level, perhaps with an eye on the prime ministership.
Modi today is locked in something of an image trap. He has a core group of very vocal supporters who constitute the hardcore “base” of the BJP. But although the disproportionately high decibel level of this base may make it seem larger than life, its support isn’t big enough for him to be catapulted to prime ministership, where, given the current state of disarray in the BJP, the party will need coalition allies to form a government.
However, Modi’s efforts to rebrand himself as a development-focussed moderate leader risk losing some of the support from this very base that is the pillar of his politics today.
In that sense, Modi could well turn out to be the LK Advani of the next generation. Within the BJP during the late 1980s and the early 1990s, Advani was the most popular leader among the hardcore base of the party. The Ayodhya campaign that he spearheaded during his term as BJP president saw the party capitalise on Rajiv Gandhi’s many follies and become a formidable parliamentary force.
Yet, when the time came for the BJP-led NDA to form a government in the mid 1990s, Advani lost out to the far more moderate AB Vajpayee – simply because for the allies on whom the BJP depended, Advani (of the rath yatra fame) was far too polarising a political figure.
In much the same way, Modi today remains a politically polarising figure. Facts count for little in a political environment where both his supporters and his detractors are swayed excessively by faith in their perception.
For diehard Modi fans, this may seem an unfair way of checkmating his ascendance at the last hurdle, when in fact he has carried his home State thrice over (and would likely win in a US presidential-style election against any other leader); has established himself as a ‘doer’.
But in the same way that the prospect of Sonia Gandhi becoming Prime Minister faced immense pushback from the political establishment even after she had led her party to victory in the 2004 elections (BJP Sushma Swaraj famously threatened to shave her head as penance for the ignominy of a foreign-born leader becoming India’s Prime Minister), Modi too faces formidable odds at the last hurdle.
Which may account for why BJP leaders were on Wednesday on the defensive, and had not much to say in defence of Modi in the context of the verdict. But their deafening silence, which finds an echo in Modi’s own manifest reluctance to speak with candour about the political undercurrents beneath the riots, only taints him and his government even further by association.
Explore: World News India
But barely a day later, the verdict in the Naroda Patiya massacre of 2002, in which former BJP Minister Maya Kodnani was found guilty of murder and conspiracy, has recoiled on the party. Of course, this is a lower court verdict, against which appeals will be made in a higher court.
Yet, the fact that the 2002 riots cases, which have been winding their weary way through the judicial process amidst all the political sloganeering, have struck so close to the political establishment and secured the conviction of a former Minister, no less, is deeply damaging for the party.
More specifically, the verdict has already reignited the chatter about the extent to which the Gujarat government, and Chief Minister Narendra Modi in particular, were complicit in the riots. More and more will we hear it be asked: Just how much did Narendra Modi know of the riots in real time?
It is one thing that Kodnani was, as the right-wing blogger @offstumped points out, perceived for long as being in the faction within the BJP that was opposed to Modi.
Contemporaneous media reports in 2005 referred to her as being “anti-Modi” and campaigning for Modi’s ouster. This, in turn, has fed conspiracy theories about the root cause of the riots (beyond the proximate cause of the Godhra train burning) and their plausible connections to power dynamics within the BJP.
Yet, Modi’s failure over the years to speak with candour about the political undercurrents that eddied beneath the riots has tainted him by association and fed the narrative that he and his government were actually complicit in the riots. Beyond noting, as he did even recently in an interview to the Wall Street Journal, that he and his government had nothing to apologise for in respect of the 2002 riots, he has not addressed the political dynamics that were at play then.
Particularly in contrast to the high-decibel barrage of the accusations against him, his silence, which appears stoic, has been self-incriminating. And even if his vocal army of diehard supporters are evidently convinced of his personal innocence, such a strategy has not enabled Modi to dispel the lingering doubts in the minds of those in the middle ground.
The legal runaround over the 2002 Gujarat riots may continue for a while, and to the extent that they help secure a semblance of justice to the victims of the riots, that process should continue. In any case, just the fact that convictions are being secured in the Gujarat riots, in stark contrast to the colossal failure to secure any justice for the victims of previous riots (including one of the the most chilling pogroms against Sikhs in 1984 following the assassination of Indira Gandhi) shows that the wheels of justice spin, even if only slowly and selectively.
But even if the cases don’t lead to Modi’s doorstep, the political taint from association is proving hard for him to wipe off. Within Gujarat, of course, he has converted the political campaign against him into an issue of Gujarati pride, and leveraged it for political goodwill. But beyond Gujarat, that victimhood narrative doesn’t enjoy as much resonance, which could prove a liability for him as he looks to spread his wings at the national level, perhaps with an eye on the prime ministership.
Modi today is locked in something of an image trap. He has a core group of very vocal supporters who constitute the hardcore “base” of the BJP. But although the disproportionately high decibel level of this base may make it seem larger than life, its support isn’t big enough for him to be catapulted to prime ministership, where, given the current state of disarray in the BJP, the party will need coalition allies to form a government.
However, Modi’s efforts to rebrand himself as a development-focussed moderate leader risk losing some of the support from this very base that is the pillar of his politics today.
In that sense, Modi could well turn out to be the LK Advani of the next generation. Within the BJP during the late 1980s and the early 1990s, Advani was the most popular leader among the hardcore base of the party. The Ayodhya campaign that he spearheaded during his term as BJP president saw the party capitalise on Rajiv Gandhi’s many follies and become a formidable parliamentary force.
Yet, when the time came for the BJP-led NDA to form a government in the mid 1990s, Advani lost out to the far more moderate AB Vajpayee – simply because for the allies on whom the BJP depended, Advani (of the rath yatra fame) was far too polarising a political figure.
In much the same way, Modi today remains a politically polarising figure. Facts count for little in a political environment where both his supporters and his detractors are swayed excessively by faith in their perception.
For diehard Modi fans, this may seem an unfair way of checkmating his ascendance at the last hurdle, when in fact he has carried his home State thrice over (and would likely win in a US presidential-style election against any other leader); has established himself as a ‘doer’.
But in the same way that the prospect of Sonia Gandhi becoming Prime Minister faced immense pushback from the political establishment even after she had led her party to victory in the 2004 elections (BJP Sushma Swaraj famously threatened to shave her head as penance for the ignominy of a foreign-born leader becoming India’s Prime Minister), Modi too faces formidable odds at the last hurdle.
Which may account for why BJP leaders were on Wednesday on the defensive, and had not much to say in defence of Modi in the context of the verdict. But their deafening silence, which finds an echo in Modi’s own manifest reluctance to speak with candour about the political undercurrents beneath the riots, only taints him and his government even further by association.
Explore: World News India
Edited By Cen Fox Post Team